Abstract. The existence of Nash equilibria in noncooperative flow control in a general productform network shared by K users is investigated. The performance objective of each user is to maximize its average throughput subject to an upper bound on its average time-delay. Previous attempts to study existence of equilibria for this flow control model were not successful, partly because the time-delay constraints couple the strategy spaces of the individual users in a way that does not allow the application of standard equilibrmm existence theorems from the game theory literature.
in noncooperative flow control in a general productform network shared by K users is investigated. The performance objective of each user is to maximize its average throughput subject to an upper bound on its average time-delay. Previous attempts to study existence of equilibria for this flow control model were not successful, partly because the time-delay constraints couple the strategy spaces of the individual users in a way that does not allow the application of standard equilibrmm existence theorems from the game theory literature.
To overcome this difficulty, a more general approach to study the existence of Nash equilibria for decentralized control schemes is introduced. This approach is based on directly proving the existence of a fixed point of the best reply correspondence of the underlying game. For the investigated flow control model, the best reply correspondence is shown to be a function, implicitly defined by means of K interdependent linear programs. Employing an appropriate definition for continuity of the set of optimal solutions of parametrized linear programs, it is shown that, under appropriate conditions, the best reply function is continuous. Brouwer's theorem implies, then, that the best reply function has a fixed point. Typically, as the load of traffic a user offers to the network increases, the packet queues at the nodal buffers build up and may eventually lead to degradation in the quality of service provided to the user, for example, to excessive delays and even to packet loss due to buffer overflow. The main objective of flow control is to achieve an efficient trade-off between high network utilization (e.g., average throughput) and guaranteed quality of service (e.g., low average time-delay and small probability of packet loss).
game [Fudenberg and Tirole 1992; Myerson 1991] . In this setting, flow control can either be cooperative, if the users are allowed to make joint decisions on their strategies, or noncooperative, if joint decisions are not possible. An extensive survey on cooperative and noncooperative optimal flow control can be found in Korilis and Lazar [1992] . In the present paper, the focus will be on noncooperative flow control.
In In the game-theory language such a point is called a Nash equilibrium.
The game theoretic models that arise in congestion control schemes are constrained games, due to the presence of stability and/or quality of service constraints.
In this type of games the set of strategies that a user is allowed to choose from is affected by the actions of the other users. The subset of the product strategy space defined by the constraints is called the joint strategy space. Existence of Nash equilibria of constrained games is typically established in the congestion control literature based on a theorem by Rosen [1965] .
The theorem asserts that a game has an equilibrium point if (i) The joint strategy space is convex and compact.
(ii) The objective function that each player seeks to maximize is concave in its own strategy and continuous at every point in the product strategy space.
The "greedy algorithm" for an .\ M/l queue was one of the first noncooperative flow control schemes to be studied in a game-theoretic framework [Bovopoulos and Lazar 1988; Mazumdar 1988, 1992] . Each user maximizes its power (average throughput over average time-delay) by regulating its (state independent) input rate. The properties of the power criterion indicate that the stability constraint of the system does not become effective, provided that the users behave optimally. Consequently, this constraint may be treated as absent, resulting in an unconstrained game, that was shown to have a unique Nash equilibrium. Convergence of synchronous and asynchronous implementations of the algorithm to the unique equilibrium point was examined in Zhang and Douligeris [1992] . The greedy algorithm for a "store-andforward" network of ./M/l queues was studied in Bovopoulos and Lazar [1988] . Existence was established using Rosen's theorem; again, the underlying model was an unconstrained one. The same theorem was also used in Orda et al. [1993] to show existence of Nash equilibria in a noncooperative routing scheme.
State-dependent flow control strategies for a network of ./M/l queues were analyzed in Hsiao and Lazar [1991] . The traffic generated by each user enters the network at a rate that depends on the number of packets that the user has outstanding in the network. 
The Model and Game Theoretic Formulation
The flow control model under consideration is depicted in Figure 1 . There are K users sharing a network of Z quasi-reversible queues [Kelly 1979 ]. This is a generalization of the model studied in Hsiao and Lazar [1991] , where a network of ./M/l-FCFS queues was considered. Node i can be of any of the following types: [Demers et al. 1989; Parekh and Gallagher 1993] . Moreover, the model allows for non-negligible propagation delays that arise in high-speed, wide-area networks, and can be represented as ./GI/~queues.
Let YI denote the set of nodes that belong to types Q) and (ii) and~z the set of type (iii) of the actions of the other users, Under this strategy, the throughput of the user is also zero, that is, Ey k = O. Let A 'k denote the product strategy space of all users except the kth. To each strategy profile A 'k in A 'k we can assign the (possibly empty) set Rk( A-k) of optimal strategies of user k, defining this way a point-to-set correspondence [Border 1985 ] from A 'k to Ak. The point-to-set correspondence Rk: A 'k +-+ Ak, that maps each A 'k G A 'k to the set of all A* k G Ak that achieve the maximum: In Section 3.2, it will be shown that Rk( A-k) is nonempty for all A-k G A-k, that is, the user always has an optimal response to any strategy profile of the other users.
Under the typical game-theoretic approach, the preferences (in terms of strategy profiles in A) of user k are expressed by means of a utility function, Uk: A -+ R, that assigns to each strategy profile A = A the "payoff" Uk( A) to the user when this profile is in effect. A Nash equilibrium of the game is a strategy profile A* G A, from which no user finds it beneficial to unilaterally deviate, such that:
The presence of the time-delay constraints does not allow a direct application of this conventional approach to the flow control game. However, the time-delay constraint of each user can be enforced as a penalty on its utility function, such that the constraint is not violated at any Nash equilibrium.
In particular, the performance objective of user k can be represented by the following utility function:
where E >0 and Ey k and ET k are the average throughput and time-delay of the user that correspond to the strategy profile A. The assignment of negative utility for the case Er k > Tk implies that the optimal response of user k to 590 Y. A. KORILIS AND A. A. LAZAR any strategy profile A 'A G A 'h of the other users never leads to a violation of its time-delay constraint, since the user can receive a zero payoff by sending no flow into the network. Hence:
Therefore, the best reply correspondence of the game (defined by means of the user utility functions (2.5)) is precisely the one given by Definition 2.2. It is easy to see that a strategy profile A* G A is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it is a fixed point of the best reply correspondence, that is, if and only if A* G I?( A"). Note that eq. (2.6) indicates that any Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile in the subset A' of the product strategy space where the time-delay constraints of all users are satisfied. A' is called the joint strategy space.
Let us now consider the problem of existence of equilibrium points of the flow control game. Since the average throughput of user k is always nonnegative, the utility function of the user, as defined in (2.5), is not continuous at any A q A, such that the user's time-delay holds tight, that is, Et-k = Tk. 1 Therefore, the classical equilibrium existence theorems for infinite games (games with strategy spaces that are not countable sets), for example, the theorems by Debreu, Glicksberg, and Fan (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole [1992] and references therein), cannot be applied, because one of their main conditions requires that the utility functions of the users be continuous at every point in the product strategy space. It is worth mentioning that, typically, in a telecommunication network the average time-delay encountered by a user increases with its average throughput, and thus the Nash equilibria (if any) of the flow control game typically appear at the discontinuity points where the time-delay constraints of the users hold tight.
The existence of equilibria in games with discontinuous payoffs has been investigated by Dasgupta and Maskin [1986] . The main existence theorem of that reference relaxes the continuity requirement to two weaker conditions. It retains, however, the quasi-concavity assumption of the theorems by Debreu, Glicksberg and Fan. More precisely, it requires that the user's utility function be quasi-concave in its strategy.z In Section 3.2, we provide a simple example showing that enforcing the constraint of the user as in eq. (2.5) results in a utility function Uk that might fail to be quasi-concave in Ak.
Hence, the conventional game-theoretic approach of incorporating the time-delay constraint of each user as an additional penalty to its payoff results in utility functions that do not satisfy, in general, the requirements of the standard existence theorems. However, since any Nash equilibrium lies in the joint strate~space, we can extend the definition Uk( A) = Eyk for all A G A,3 but restrict the set of admissible strategy profiles to the joint strategy space A'. Under this approach, the time-delay constraints introduce a coupling of the individual strategy spaces, since the set of strategies that a user is allowed to 1 These discontmuities cannot be removed, even if we define UA( N = O for the case ETA > Tk.
k -o for all lk > 0 Hence, for any As can be seen by the analysis in Section 3, EyL > 0 unless AIi -$ such that ETh = Tk >0, we have E-yh >0.
-A function~: R" a R! is quasi-concave if and only if for any x, y = 02" and any a = [0,1], we have~(ax + (1 -a)y) > min{~(x),~(y)}. This extension makes Uk continuous at every A = A, since Ey k is a continuous function of A, as can be seen from the analysis in Section 3.
choose from is a subset of its strategy space and depends on the actions of the other users. Existence of equilibria for constrained games of this type is typically established based on Rosen's theorem [Rosen 1965 ], which requires that: (i) the joint strategy space be convex and compact, and (ii) the utility function of each user be continuous at every A 6 A and concave in Ak. For the flow control game, simple examples can be constructed (see Section B.1 in Appendix B) to demonstrate that, in general, the joint strategy space is not convex. Thus, Rosen's theorem cannot be applied to deduce existence of Nash equilibria.
The conditions that the existence theorems impose on the individual utility functions and/or the joint strategy space are sujj'7cient conditions that guarantee-via the Kakutani fixed-point theorem [Border 1985 ] -thrut the best reply correspondence has a fixed point. Since the conditions of these theorems are not satisfied by the flow control model under consideration, we take a more general approach and study directly the existence of fixed points of its best reply correspondence.
It is essential to realize that this correspondence encapsulates the constraints (see (2.3)), leaving, this way, the individual strategy spaces uncoupled. The structure of the best reply correspondence has been characterized in Hsiao and Lazar [1991] and is briefly presented in the following section.
The Structure of the Best Reply Correspondence
Suppose that the flow control strategies of all users except the Icth are fixed and described by the profile A-k, The best reply of user k to this strategy profile is the set (Definition 2.2):
To find the structure of Rk( A-k), we need analytic expressions for the average throughput and time-delay of user k. The properties of the average throughput are presented in Subsection 3.1. These properties are used in Subsection 3.2 to transform the optimization problem on the right-hand side of eq. (3.1) into a linear program and characterize the structure of the user's best reply correspondence.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE AVERAGE THROUGHPUT.
Let u~denote the conditional expectation of the rate at which class k packets are served by the network, given that there are 1A such packets in it. If p~is the probability that the number of class k packets in the network is lk, then the average throughput Ey k of user k and the average number of packets EQL that the user has in the network are:
The average time-delay of the user is given by Little's formula [Kelly 1979; Schwartz 1987 The probability that there are 1~class k packets in the network is then:
N.
Pt= x~p(n), Zk=O,...,N,.
(3.4) lm=on~xl, > .,lK) m+k The expected rate of class k packets leaving the network through node i, given that the state of the node is n,, is:
Equation
(3.5) is immediate for the ./GI/l-PS and .\GI/~cases. For an ./M/ l-FCFS or a ./GI/l-LCFS queue, given that its state is n,, the packet classes in the queue are independent [Kelly 1979 ] and, provided that the queue is not empty, nkl/X~nm, is the probability that the packet in service is of class k. Note that Z, qk'(n,) is the expected service rate of class k packets, given that the network is in state n = (nl, ..., nf).
The conditional expectation of the rate at which class k packets are served by the network, given that there are lk (1 s This property can be verified for the network model of Figure 1 , using eqs.
(3.4) and (3.6).5 Note that eqs. (3.7) are precisely the detailed balance equations of the birth-death process that describes the state of an M/M/1 queue k Therefore, the with state-dependent service rate vf and arrival rate Al,.
average throughput of user k is equal~o the throughput of the queueing model depicted in Figure 2 , which is usually called Norton's equivalent [Schwartz 1987] . By abuse of terminology, the term, Norton's equivalent, will be used to denote both the equivalent model in Figure 2 and the vector of conditional estimates Vk = ( v~)~=,.
This structural result, called the separation principle, was used in Hsiao and Lazar [1991] to transform the optimization problem in eq. (3.1) into a linear program. The linear programming formulation will be presented in the following subsection.
Observe that the expression in the denominator of v~in eq. In this section, we show that the best reply Rk( A-k) of user k to any strategy profile A-k of the other users is a set of "band-bang" control strategies. Using eqs. (3.2) and (3.3), the best of user k can be written as: Constraints (3.13) represent the detailed balance equations (3.7). Constraint (3.15) is the peak constraint on the control which, together with the nonnegativity constraints, assures that Ak E Ak. Thus, the linear program is equivalent to the maximization problem in (3.9). The linear program (3.12)-(3. 18) is parametrized by A-k, the strategy profile of the other users, through the Norton's equivalent v'. Let &k: A 'k~+ R2~'+ 1 denote the point-to-set correspondence that maps each strategy profile A-k to the set of optimal solutions of the linear program. If (yk, pk) is a point in _$?h (A-k) Let Ak be as in eq. (3.20) . Then the peak constraints (3.15) of the linear program for O s lk < Lk, lk + mk, are binding (hold as equalities), while the peak constraint for lk = mk is nonbinding. Thus, the last assertion of Lemma 3.2.1 implies that, at optimality, at most one of the peak constraints (3.15) for lk = O,..., Lk -1, or the time-delay constraint (3.16) can be nonbinding.
If a Nash equilibrium exists, then it is a profile of window-type strategies, as described by (3.20). Existence of equilibria was established in Hsiao and Lazar [1991] only for the special class of product-form networks, where the equivalent service rate v~is concave increasing in lk, for every user k. Under this assumption, the user's optimal strategy is unique [Lazar 1983 ], and thus its best reply correspondence is a point-to-point mapping, that is, a function. Furthermore, any intermediate point of the user's best reply appears at the end of the window ( mk = Lk -1).Nevertheless, simple examples show that these monotonicity properties do not necessarily characterize product-form networks. Consider, for instance, a single ./M/ l-FCFS queue with service rate p = 1 shared by two users, and take NI = Nz = 2 and Az = (1/19, 2). Then, eq. (B.2), in Appendix B, gives v{ = 0.814> 0.794 = vi.
This lack of monotonicity is inherited by the average throughput and time-delay of the user and does not allow the application of standard existence results from the game theory literature to the flow control game. The following example shows that the utility function of user k, as defined in (2.5), might fail to be quasi-concave in Ah. (2)), for which E-y~(3) = 1.028, E7~(3) = 1.548, thus U~( AL(3), A-k) = -e < 0. Therefore, U~(A~(3), A-k) < min{Uk(A~(l), In the following section, the uniqueness result of Lazar [1983] is extended to the general case where no monotonicity assumptions are made on the equivalent service rate. This result will be used in subsequent sections to substantially simplify the overall proof of existence of a Nash equilibrium point.
The Best Reply Correspondence
Is a Function
In this section, we show that the best reply of user k to any strategy profile of the other users is unique and, therefore, its best reply correspondence is a function.
This amounts to showing that the optimal flow control strategy of the single-class model depicted in Figure 2 is unique. Throughout this section, we temporarily drop the sub\superscripts that denote the particular user to simplify the notation. is unique.
PROOF.
Suppose that there exist two distinct optimal flow control strategies, say A(l) and A(2). Let (y(l), p(l)) and (y(2), p(2)) be the corresponding optimal solutions of the linear program. Then, by linearity, (y(3), p(3)) = 0.5(y(l), p(l)) + 0.5(y(2), p(2)) is also an optimal solution. Let ET(i) denote the average time-delay achieved by (y(i), p(i)), i = 1,2,3. All optimal solutions achieve the same average throughput.
If L, is the window size (see Lemma 3.2.1) resulting from the optimal solution (y(i), p(i)), it is easy to see that Lq = max{Ll, Lz}. If a peak constraint is nonbinding for one of the optimal solutions, say (y(l), p(l)), the same constraint is nonbinding for (y(3), p(3)). To see this, assume that yin(l) -cp~(l) <0, for some m < L1. Then, y~(3) -cp~(3) = 0.5(y~(l) -cp~(l)) + 0.5(yn(2) -cp~(2)) <0. Similarly, if the time-delay constraint is nonbinding for one of (y(i), p(i)),
it is nonbinding for (y(3), p(3)) as well. We have to consider the following cases:
(i) At least one of ET(1) and ET(2) is less than T.
Then ET(3) < T. Therefore, both A(1) and A(2) must have fidl windows, with no intermediate points.8 Since these optimal solutions are distinct, their windows are not equal. Suppose that L~< Lz < N. Then:
y&(l) = o, p~,(l) >0, yl.,(2) = cpLJ2) .
HIf one of them, say Ml), had an intermediate point, (y(l), p(l)) would lead to a nonbinding peak constraint of the linear program and the same constraint would be nonbinding for (y(3), p(3)), contradicting this way optimality of ( Y(3), p(3)): see Remark 3.2.
This implies that both the time-delay constraint and the peak constraint for 1 = L1 < L~are non-binding at (y(3), p(3)). Thus, according to Remark 3.2.2, (y(3), p(3)) cannot be an optimal solution of the linear program.
(ii) E'r(l) =~T ( Since ET(1) = ET(2) = T and Ey(l) = E7(2), then EQ(l) = EQ(2). In view of (4.1) and (4.2), the latter can hold only if or equivalently:
Recalling that c Y O, we conclude that eq. (4.3) is a contradiction, since the expression on its left-hand side is always positive.
Finally, consider the case where both A(l) and A(2) have full windows and assume that L~< Lz. A similar argument, based on the equality of the average queue lengths, can be used to obtain a contradiction to A(1) + A(2).
u Proposition 4.1, together with Lemma 3.2.1, generalizes the results of Lazar [1983] for the flow control model of Figure 2 , to the case where no assumptions are made on the rnonotonicity properties of the state-dependent service rate. The optimal flow control strategy is unique and has a generalized window structure with at most one intermediate point. Under the assumptions of Lazar [1983] the intermediate point can only appear at the end of the window. The following example shows that if the Norton's equivalent is not concave increasing, the optimal strategy may have an intermediate point that does not occur at the end of the window. Thus, the structure of the optimal strategy is completely characterized by Lemma 3.2.1 and Proposition 4.1. Extending Proposition 4.1 to the multiclass model of Figure 1 , we conclude that the best reply correspondence of user k is a best repij function Rk:
A-h -+ Ak that maps each strategy profile A-h to the unique best reply of user k. Consequently, the best reply correspondence of the flow control game is also a function R: A + A and its definition in (2.4) can be rewritten as:
... R~(~)),), A=A. A Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of this best reply function, that is, a strategy profile A* = A, such that A* = R( A*).
Continuity of the Best Reply Function
Sufficient conditions for a function to have a fixed point are provided by Brouwer's theorem [Border 1985 ]. The theorem asserts that a continuous function mapping a convex and compact set into itself has a fixed point. The product strategy space A satisfies the convexity and compactness requirements of Brouwer's theorem. Therefore, if the best reply function R: A~A is continuous, it has a fixed point which is a Nash equilibrium of the flow control game. In this section we show that, under a certain regularity condition, R is indeed continuous.
The best reply function of user k is defined implicitly, by means of the linear program (3.12)-(3.18). Specifically, AL is the best reply to A-k, if and only if the equilibrium distribution pk and the equilibrium flows y k resulting from (AL A-k) are the optimal solution of the linear program. Let f k: A s llz~' + 1 de~ote the function that assigns to each (AL, A-') the corresponding equilibrium distribution and equilibrium flows, according to eqs. (3.6), (3.10), and (3.11). Then, for all (Ak, A-k) = A:
Clearly, the continuity properties of Rk are closely related to those of J?'h.9 The continuity of L?" is treated in a general setting in Appendix A. In that appendix we consider a parametrized linear program and investigate the continuity properties of the set of its optimal solutions. We employ a definition of continuity for the general case, that includes the possibility of multiple optimal solutions, and derive sufficient conditions for continuity in Theorem A.3. These conditions require that the dual linear program exhibits certain properties.
YThroughout this section S?k-defined as a point-to-set correspondence m SectIon 3.2-will be treated as a fiwtctton, by virtue of Proposition 4.1.
By abuse of terminology, the dual linear program associated with (3.12)-(3.18) will be referred to as the dual flow control problem. The dual problem is also parametrized by the strategy profile A-k of the other users through the Norton's equivalent v '. Let~k( A 'k ) denote the set of its optimal solutions. Then, Corollary In the sequel, we will derive a sufficient condition for the dual flow control problem to satisfj' property (ii).
The dual flow control problem for user k is a minimization problem with unknown vector w k = R 2N'+ 2 described by: we have:
From (5.1) and eq. (5.15), we obtain:
(5.16) From eqs. (3.10) and (3.11) and continuity of the Norton's equivalent Vk in A-k it is easy to see that fk: A~R2~'+1 is continuous. Furthermore, Y'k is continuous, by Lemma 5.2. Taking the limit as n -+~on both sides of eq. (5.16), we get:
Then, (5.1) implies A k = Rk( A 'h ) and continuity of Rk follows. Continuity of Fk in A-k can be proven using the continuity of the best reply function and the Norton's equivalent associated with user k. The details are left to the reader. Recall, from eq. (3.8), that I! = minA-k V; > 0 is the minimum rate at which user k is served in the network, given that it has one packet in it. Hence, 1/1~is the maximum time-delay of the user with one packet in the network. The sufficient condition (5.8) for continuity of Rk ensures that if user k sends just one packet in the network, that is, if A: > 0 and A~, = O for all 1~z 1, then its time-delay constraint is not violated, independently of the actions of the other users. As explained in Section 3.2, user k has a best reply to any strategy profile A 'k = A-h of the other users. Condition (5.8), then, implies that this best reply is such that the user sends at least one packet in the network. In other words, it is a regularity condition guaranteeing that the flow control problem has always the structure of a K-person game: there is no strategy profile of the other users, that can force user k to refrain from utilizing network resources, in order to satisfy its time-delay constraint. In fact, if user k can be forced by the actions of the other users to send no flow into the network, its best reply function is discontinuous.
More specifically, using eq. (3.10) in eqs. (3.2) and (3.3), it can be easily verified that the average throughput of the user is increasing in A;, while its average time-delay does not depend on Al. Thus, as long as the user can satisfy its time-delay constraint, Al is equal to Ck, whereas inability of the user to satisfy its constraint implies At = O Therefore, if the user is forced to "withdraw" from the game, A$ drops from c-k to zero and its best reply function is discontinuous.
A condition similar to (5.8) has been postulated in Lazar [1983] for the time-delay constraint of the user. A condition that secures that no user can be forced by the actions of the others to withdraw from the game has also been imposed on the routing game of Orda et al. [1993] . It is important to notice that condition (5.8) does not imply that the time-delay constraint of the user will not hold tight at an equilibrium.
Typically, the average time-delay of the user increases with the number of packets it sends into the network.1" Therefore, although the constraint is not effective if the user sends just one packet, it will eventually become tight as the user sends more packets in the network, in order to maximize its throughput.
Since the individual best reply functions are continuous (Theorem 5.3), the best reply function of the flow control game R: A~A, defined by eq. (4.4), is also continuous and, by Brouwer's theorem, it has a fixed point. This point is a Nash equilibrium of the flow control game. We have, therefore, proven the following: THEOREM 5.5.
A Nash equilibrium point exists for the jlow control problem of K users sharing a network of quasi-rellersible queues, when the control of user k
(1 < k < K) is state-dependent and bounded and its performance objectiue is to maximize its individual aL'erage throughput subject to an upper bound Tk = @ on its auerage time-delay. Remark 5.6.
An immediate question that arises from the existence result of Theorem 5.5, is whether the flow control game has a unique or multiple Nash equilibria.
In Appendix B.3, we provide a simple example of a two-user flow control game with multiple equilibria. The presence of multiple Nash equilibria is to be contrasted with the uniqueness results for the greedy algorithm in Bovopoulos and Lazar [1988] and Douligeris and Mazumdar [1988] .
'0 In single-class networks of ./M/l queues, the average time-delay increases with the number of packets [Walrand 1988 ]. Although there is no proof of this monotonicity result for general multiclass queueing systems, this behawor is typical in telecommunication networks.
It is important to realize that, although the best reply correspondence of the flow control model considered in this paper is a function, uniqueness of the best reply for each user is not the key property that leads to the existence result of Theorem 5.5. Rather, the continuity of the best reply function plays the fundamental role in the existence of Nash equilibria. In general, the best reply correspondence of a congestion control scheme might not be a function. In such cases, Kakutani's theorem provides sufficient conditions for a point-toset correspondence, mapping a convex and compact set into itself, to have a fixed point. Continuity in Brouwer's theorem is replaced by closeness (Definition A.1 in Appendix A) of the correspondence in Kakutani's theorem; there is also an additional condition that requires that the best reply of each user to any strategy profile of the other users be a nonempty and convex set. Since the set of optimal solutions of a linear program is convex, given that it is not empty, Theorem A.3 provides sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium points in decentralized control schemes, where the control parameters are determined by means of a number of interconnected (mutually parametrized) linear programs.
Conclusions
In the present paper, we investigated the existence of Nash equilibria in noncooperative flow control of a general product-form network. Existence of equilibria was established, under a regularity condition guaranteeing that no user can be forced by the other users to withdraw from utilizing network resources. The network model is one of the most general analytically tractable models: a network of quasi-reversible queues. High-speed networks with propagation delays and nodal schedulers that approximate the processor sharing service discipline belong to this category. The user performance objective, defined as maximizing the utilization of network resources without violating certain quality of service constraints, is well suited for realistic networking environments. This is to be contrasted with other game theoretic studies in the congestion control literature, where it is a priori assumed that the users' utility functions satisfy first and second order monotonicity properties that allow a direct application of standard equilibrium existence results. We proposed a general method to study the existence of equilibria in noncooperative congestion control schemes that is based on the best reply correspondence of the underlying game. This method relies on the most general mathematical techniques available to show existence of noncooperative equilibria, namely fixed-point theorems. Thus, it can be applied to constrained game models that do not satisfy the conditions of standard game theoretic results, for example, Rosen's theorem.
The problem of continuity of the optimal solution correspondence of a parametrized linear program was addressed. Theorem A.3 provides sufficient conditions for this correspondence to be closed and is of interest on its own right. More importantly, it can be readily applied to study the existence of equilibria in decentralized control schemes where the control parameters are determined via a collection of interdependent linear programs. Several topics for future research arise from the existence result, such as characterizing the set of Nash equilibria and their properties (e.g., stability) and examining convergence of synchronous and asynchronous algorithms to an equilibrium point. The formulation of the flow control problem around its best reply function provides a means to systematically study these topics. Moreover, the properties of the best reply function established in the present paper might prove to be an important starting point in this direction. 2). The set of optimal solutions of this linear program depends on the parameter x and is denoted by 57(x). This way, we define a point-to-set correspondence .5?: X s~R", that maps each x E X to the set of optimal solutions of the linear program. Therefore, to address the issue of continuity in linear programming, we need an appropriate definition of continuity for point-to-set correspondences. Conceptually, continuity means that a small perturbation in the parameter x will result in a small change in the set of optimal solutions of the linear program. There are several definitions that generalize the concept of continuity from functions to correspondences [Takayama 1985 ]. In the present paper, we adopt the concept of a closed correspondence. In the sequel, we derive sufficient conditions for a continuously parametrized linear program to have a closed graph. Continuity considerations are scarce in the linear-programming literature.
Most of the related studies treat cases where either the objective vector c, or the right-hand-side vector b is varied linearly with the parameter and concentrate on the implications of this perturbation on the optimal basis and the simplex method; see, for example, Bazaraa et al. [1990, Chapter 6] and references therein. In a more general context, sufficient conditions for continuity of the set of solutions to a parametrized maximization problem are given by the "maximum theorem," due to Berge [1963] , which is one of the fundamental theorems employed in mathematical economics [Border 1985; Takayama 1985] . However, as will be explained in the sequel, the maximum theorem does not have the precise form needed in this paper.
Consider the Define the point-to-set correspondence~: X -+~D?k that maps each x~X to the set of optimal solutions of the dual linear program. If there exists a pair of y and w that satis~the optimality conditions (A.3)-(A.6), then y G-'%'(x) and w =9(x).
We are now ready to prove the following: for all x = X satisjjing &Z(x) + 0, then the point-to-set correspondence --$% X~A Rm is closed.
PROOF.
Let {(x", y"), n z 0} be a convergent sequence in 22%, with limit (x, y). We have to show that (x, y) = S%%.
For all n, we have yn =%(.x"). Thus, there exists a w", such that the optimality conditions (A.3)-(A.6) are satisfied:
w"b(x") = C(X")y 'z, y" >0.
606~. A. KORILIS AND A. A. LAZAR
Condition (A.7) implies that, for all n a O, w" can be chosen to belong to W. Hence, {w"} is a sequence in a compact set and it has a convergent subsequence {w~n, n~O} with limit w = W, Note that for all n:
By continuity of A(.), b(.), and co, taking the limit as n -~in (A.8), we get:
These are precisely the optimality conditions that imply that y = L?'(x), or equivalently that (x, y) = 3'2'-'. u
Condition
(A.7) requires that whenever the primal linear program has an optimal solution, at least one optimal solution of the dual belongs to W. The set of optimal solutions of the dual is not necessarily a subset of W, but its intersection with W' must be nonempty. The following example shows that if this sufficient condition is not satisfied, L? might fail to be closed. (A.9) (A.1O) a closed graph (take x"~O). On the other hand, for every compact subset W of Rz, the~e &xists some x z O, sufficiently small, such that~(x) n W = 0, as can be seen from (A. 10). This situation is depicted in Figure 3 . Remark A.5.11 The problem of continuity in linear programming is a special case of the problem addressed in the "maximum theorem" [Berge 1963 ], which '' The discussion m this remark requires famiharity with topological notions, such as upper and lower semi-continuity of correspondences [Border 1985; Takayama 1985] . The definitions of which will not be presented here. states that the set of solutions to the problem of maximizing a cdmtinuous function over a compact set that varies continuously with some parameter is an upper semi-continuous correspondence. We concentrate on the case that the constraint set '%(x) is a subset of a compact set Y c R~, since this is the structure of the linear program (3.12)-(3.18). Evidently, f is continuous in X @ Y and f%(x) is a compact set for all x = X, as it is required by the maximum theorem. Furthermore, it is easy to see that '%: X~e Y is closed and, since Y is compact, it is also upper semi-continuous.
Nonetheless, %' is not lower semicontinuous in general, as can be seen by the example following Theorem A.3. In that example, we have: In this appendix we use a simple flow control model to construct three examples, the first of which demonstrates that the joint strategy space is nonconvex, the second that if the sufficient condition of Theorem 5.3 is relaxed, the best reply function of user k might be discontinuous, and the third that a flow control game might, in general, have multiple Nash equilibria.
Consider the flow control model of Figure 1 with two users and the network consisting of a single ./M/ l-FCFS queue with service rate~. Let (1,, Zz) be the state of the network queue, where lk is the number of Using eqs. (2.1) and (2.2), the equilibrium distribution of
The conditional estimate of the rate at which class 1 the network queue, given that there are /l such packets in it, is: 4,= ,;O P&-P,,,, The conditional estimates vl~for user 2 are given by a similar expression.
B.1. The Joint Strategy Space is Nonconvex
Let us now provide an example that shows that the joint strategy space defined as the subset of A in which the time-delay constraints of all users are satisfied, that is, A' = {A = A: Erk s T~, k = 1,..., K} is not convex. For the two-user model under consideration, the average throughput and average queue length for user 1 are respectively: Figure 4 and can be easily seen not to be convex.
B.2. Discontinuity of the Best Reply Function
Let us now construct an example that demonstrates that the best reply function of a user might be discontinuous if its time-delay bound does not satisfy the sufficient condition (5.8) of Theorem 5.3.
Consider the two-user model and restrict Ak (k = 1,2) to strategies that have the window structure described by eq. where Lk is some integer between 1 and Nk. Suppose that user 2 employs a strategy A' G A'. Then, vi is concave increasing in 11 [Hsiao and Lazar 1984] . In that case, according to Lazar [1983] , the best reply of user 1 will have the structure described by eq. (B.6). Therefore, if one of the users clhooses a strategy as in eq. (B.6), all subsequent best replies of both users will be of the same type. This observation allows us to concentrate only on strategies Ah 6 Ak. However, in doing so, we do not consider all the admissible strategies of the users and we partially observe the behavior of the flow control game.
Due to its special structure, any strategy AL~Ah can be represented by a single scalar, instead of a vector. Specifically, let us define Sk = Z~=-o* ,i~.
Then, any s~~[0, Nkc~] corresponds to a unique strategy Ak E AL. Th~s observation allows us to represent the best replies of the users in two-dimensional plots.
Using standard differentiation techniques, it is a matter of simple algebra to verify that v~,, given in eq. (B.2), is strictly decreasing in A;,, O s 12 < Nz. Therefore, v; attains its minimum value when A;, = C2, for all 1,. Now, let N1=N2=5, p=l, cl=c~= 2 and 7'1 = 5. From eq. (B.2) with fi, = C2, we have l\I~= 5.092> T 1, that is, the sufficient condition (5.8) for continuity of R 1 is not satisfied. The best reply function of user 1 versus Sz is shown in Figure 5 . From that figure, it is evident that the best reply function of user 1 is not continuous.
In particular, at S2 = 9.625 the user's best reply drops from 2 to O; note that this indicates that R 1 is not continuous in~~, when & = .00 = A: = 2. Using the same example, we have observed that the best reply function is indeed discontinuous whenever T 1 does not satisfy (5.8); as T 1 is increased toward 5.092, the discontinuity point moves toward S2 = 10.
Existence of Maltiple Nash Equilibria
We now proceed with an example that demonstrates that the flow control game might have multiple Nash equilibria. Consider the two-user model of the previous example. As in that example, we concentrate on strategies AL of the type described by eq. (B.6), that can be represented by a single scalar Sk = [O, NA c k]. If we plot the best reply curves of both users in the same S1 -s z coordinate system, it is easy to see that the points where these two curves intersect are Nash equilibria of the flow control game. Note, however, that by using this method we can determine only the equilibria that have the structure described by eq. (B.6).
